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Post-war Lebanese communities in search of reconciliation 
 
Fifteen years have passed already since the Taif conference of October 1989 where some 70 Lebanese 
MPs agreed, with heavy pressure from Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United States, to put an end to 
fifteen years of civil war in their country.  
At the time of the signature of the Taif agreement, there were great expectations among exhausted 
civilians who had been the primary victims of foreign armies and local militias. There was a general 
aspiration to return among emigrates, and more-over for several hundred thousands of internally 
displaced persons, some of whom had fled Israeli invasions of the South, or Syrian bombings of Beirut 
and Tripoli, but whose large majority had fled inter-sectarian assassinations such as on the ―Black 
Sunday‖ of December 1975 in East Beirut, or inter-sectarian fighting such as the ―War of the 
Mountain‖ between Christian Phalangist ―Lebanese Forces‖ and Druze ―Socialist Progressive‖ 
combatants in 1983-4. 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the two catchwords for all Lebanese were ―reconstruction‖ and 
―reconciliation‖. This article will leave aside the issue of physical and economic reconstruction, and of 
its controversial assessment. It focuses on ―reconciliation‖. Interestingly, the word is polysemic. It may 
refer to criminal/victim relation, to the general reconstruction of social link after a period of anomy 
such as a civil war, or to the adoption of a new political pact between elites. When it comes to Lebanon, 
it always bears a religious dimension.  
An understanding had to be reached about the bases and the methods for national reconciliation. In the 
past, Lebanon had been a model of prosperity and intercommunal balance; now "Lebanonization" 
denoted a state in disarray, marked by ethnic conflicts. How could diverse communal group identities 
be respected without undermining the democratic functioning of the rule of law? And how was it 
possible to reconcile respect for pluralism with respect for the common legal and policing rules that are 
the basis for the functioning of the state?  
 
The renewal of communalism 
In Lebanon, according to the model of ―consociational democracy‖ proposed by Arend Lijphart,1 
altogether a descriptive and a normative model, political power is not distributed according to majority 
rule. Rather, its sharing is the result of an agreement between elites of the 18 religious segments that 
divide the society. This is why it is labelled siyâsa tâ’ifiyya, ―sectarian politics‖ or ―political 
communalism‖. Moreover, since Lebanese independence in 1943, political power has been organised 
within the bilateral framework of a tacit agreement for power sharing between Christians and Muslims. 
                                                                                       
1 The Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart formulated the concept of consociational democracy in the clearest 
and most exhaustive manner. Lijphart 1977. Under the influence of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and through 
the work of Theodor Hanf, Lebanese intellectuals especially refer to « Proportzdemokratie » or 
« Konkordanzdemokratie » as theorised by Gerhard Lehmbruch. 
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After the civil war, the principles suggested by Lijphart – governmental coalition, segmental autonomy, 
proportional representation and the right of veto - remain the very same which guided the framers of the 
Lebanese Constitution in May 1926 and of the Electoral Law in that same year,
2
 then the leaders of 
independence at the time of the adoption of the National Pact in 1943. These principles were again 
endorsed at the time of the adoption of the ―Document of National Reconciliation‖ at Taif in 1989.3 In 
the aura of satisfaction of peace recovered and with the conviction that common misfortune had at last 
forged a Lebanese national identity,
4
 the reconstruction of the Lebanese political system thus consisted 
in a restoration which the pre-war liberal elites would not even have dared dream of. 
The most salient feature of Lebanon's post-war political system is thus the solidification of political 
communalism. Although demands for its elimination still hovered, the members of parliament 
preserved the famous article 95 of the constitution, which stipulates, "in the transition period [which has 
persisted since 1926] . . . the communities shall be equitably represented in the ministries."
5
 
Communalism has not only been reinforced but also enshrined. For while the National Pact of 1943 
only evoked the unwritten rule of communal coexistence, now a "pact of shared existence" was made 
explicit, and the government's legitimacy was based on this new pact.
6
 At the same time the principle of 
political communalism was somewhat modified, since the 54:45 balance of parliamentary seats was 
split evenly 50:50 between Christians and Muslims, and parity extended to high-ranking posts in 
government and the public sector. 
The 1989 Taif inter-Lebanese agreement that ended the war, brought a new dimension to political 
communalism, it made official what had been tacit before the war. It fixed what had been relative and 
negotiable, before. After the war, and for the first time, the main power positions were constitutionally 
allocated to precise communities: the presidency to the Maronites, Prime ministry to the Sunnis, the 
presidency of Parliament to the Shiites, and so on. As a matter of consequence, the new Lebanese 
constitution adopted the following year does more than just reflect the resilience of the sectarian groups 
as the more immediately operative part of the Lebanese social structure. It is used to codify a deeper 
split between communities, and especially between Christians and Muslims, in such way that the new 
power-sharing organised in the Taif agreement has become, not an instrument for inter-sectarian 
accommodation, but rather a means of incorporating the society through communal belongings, and 
keeping it under the patronage of sectarian elites.  
Also, in the post war period, religion has become the paradigm for the interpretation of norms, and the 
ruling of social behaviour. Lebanese citizens are caught in every dimension of their daily mundane life 
                                                                                       
2 Rondot 1957, 69. The fixing of the number of representatives and their repartition were settled by an order of 
the High Commissioner on March 1922, enforced in 1926. 
3 Maila 1992. 
4 Hanf 1993. 
5 Al-Dastûr al-lubnânî 1990. 
6 See the eleventh and last general principle of the Document of National Reconciliation. Among the political 
reforms described in title II are equitable (among Christians and Muslims) and proportional (among the various 
sects) distribution of parliamentary seats.  
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into a web of religious symbols
7
 and into networks of sectarian belongings. Settlement, education, even 
in government schools, leisure and, of course, civil status (marriage, heritage, parental authority) are 
still organised along rules inherited from the Ottoman millet system, that all stress the sectarian identity 
of the self. There is a constant search for same communal neighbourhood in order to avoid conflict 
between groups at the local level. Inter-sectarian accommodation is built on a living memory of 
tradition differences and past conflicts. 
Truly, the civil war resulted in the deepening of the sectarian divide, through a combined process of 
social withdrawal on primordial identities, and political manipulation of fears and utopias. In the post 
war period, secular culture, shared ethical references, and trans-sectarian political projects that had been 
gaining ground in the 1960s and 1970s, gave way to the display of public and often intolerant 
demonstrations of religious belief and sectarian solidarity, beneath the existence of a dialogue between 
religious hierarchies and intellectuals, and despite the usual denial of sectarian division. Two 
emblematic examples are worth mentioning here.  
The first is the re-invention of a Shiite tradition, ‘Ashûra, the celebration of the ten days of Husayn 
(prophet Muhammad‘s grand-son)‘s martyrdom in 680 of our era. ‘Ashûra had long been 
commemorated by Lebanese Shiis, especially in South Lebanon. It was taken over by Hizbollah after 
1982, and, since then, the political anti-Western and anti-Israeli slogans chanted during the mourning 
demonstration are permeated with anti-Jewish, and also anti-Christian messages. 
The second is the renewal of the monastic life among Christians of all denominations in connection 
with the past commitment of powerful monastic Orders and convents on the side of Christian militia 
groups during the war.
8
 While there is in the post war decade a remarkable renewal of mystical and 
theological life, and religious studies we can also observe that several Christian militant groups are 
attracting young Lebanese because of their refusal of, or lack of faith in, a shared Lebanese national 
identity, and because of their strong feeling of estrangement from their Muslim environment (to the 
point of denial of their Arab identity). As a matter of consequence, the cultural and political 
socialisation by each community, its clerics and its confessional schools provides young generations 
with a strong ideological structure of differences – the inspiration for potential aggressive relationship 
with the people of other sectarian groups. Their religious involvement is taken as a refuge from what 
they dread as an external danger. Even more, in a few cases, their new religious involvement is 
connected to a political and military project inspired by the ideology of war of cultures, or religions in 
conflict. 
The Taif document was as much an imposed formula as the reflection of a dominant, war-induced 
popular notion of communal identity. As a matter of consequence, the new constitution adopted in 
September 1990 codified communal groups interaction. In contrast with the 1970s, when secular 
customs and aspirations had become widespread, and standardised urban culture had developed, 
                                                                                       
7 Geertz 1973, 87-125. 
8 Picard  1994, 152. 
 4 
cultural identities are now stressed and celebrated, group particularities defended. The refusal to abolish 
political communalism not only lifted the taboo against communal socialisation but also presented it as 
the norm. Insecurity, dispersion of families, generational differences, the loss of socio-economic 
markers at a time of paralysis, and subsequent break-up of the state structure—all contributed to the 
revaluation of the religious community as final criteria of identity. Communal differences became the 
guiding principle of ethical analysis all the more so since the changes of the post-modern world also 
played a part: Replacing bipolar conflict as the dominant global dynamic in what Samuel Huntington 
called the "clash of civilizations" in which ethnic groups are drawn together to form communities and 
demand political representation or even a territorial homeland.  
As a result, under the Second Lebanese Republic, the questions of communalism and consensus 
democracy are the object of controversies whose stakes are far from being merely intellectual: Conflicts 
of power between the former and the new elites, and conflicts concerning the future of a political 
construction whose rationale seems to consist more in making itself permeable to external interferences 
than to the realisation of a common project. For, notwithstanding the importance of external factors in 
the destiny of a country like Lebanon (as made clear in the formula «the strength of Lebanon lies in its 
weakness»), these domestic factors are decisive.
9
  
In search of national reconciliation  
Nothing illustrates better the obstacles and flaws in national reconciliation in the years following the 
war than the interrelated questions of demobilisation of armed groups, and the granting of political 
amnesty.  
The dissolution of the militias and the integration of a number of militiamen into the military and 
civilian branches of the public service were swiftly but only partially implemented. A decision was 
taken by the Council of ministers to disband all militias except Hizbollah. It was made effective in 
March 1991. In October 1993, when the results of the first - and only - wave of integration were made 
public, 6,000 ex-militiamen only (out of an estimate of 50,000), and a few dozen officers had joined the 
regular forces.
10
   
Once this limited demobilisation implemented, there was a legitimate need to turn the page by issuing a 
general amnesty. While this amnesty was designed in principle to foster national reconciliation and to 
favour the regeneration of a common and peaceful political culture, it was implemented in a 
problematic manner since the demobilisation process remained unfinished. Moreover, it was selective, 
and thus hampered the task of social reconstruction: The dividing line between those who benefited 
from the amnesty and those excluded from it, far from rehabilitating and reaffirming the basis of a 
common identity, on the contrary, ran the risk of deepening the cleavage between irreconcilable 
conceptions of national identity. 
                                                                                       
9 Zolberg 1980, 749. On these interactions in Lebanon, Owen 1976. 
10 Picard 1999. 
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It is not possible to engage here in the complex juridical debate over the criteria that qualified actions 
falling under the Amnesty law. It is enough to acknowledge that it posed a number of problems both in 
principle and in practice. With regard to principles, it erased a number of crimes committed across 
communal lines, much like the memories of the events of 1860 - the war that took place over a hundred 
years ago between Maronites and Druze – had been erased. As a corollary it excluded from the process 
of reconciliation the losers in the civil war, now demoted to the level of the enemy - namely the South 
Lebanon Army militia that collaborated with Israel during more than 20 years of occupation, but also 
segments of the (Christian) Lebanese Forces who did not accept the Taif agreement.  
In Lebanon like in many war-torn countries, the granting of amnesty after a civil war was a political act 
par excellence, which aimed at reintegrating the greatest possible number of people by ignoring their 
crimes. The state evaded any question about the past conduct of most of the war‘s protagonists, in such 
way that post war political practices became contaminated by the militia spirit. Whereas many 
traditional leaders were dead or in exile, most of the post war political establishment belonged to new 
social categories. It was not only a generational change, nor was it simply the arrival of the new 
urbanised strata on the public scene. It involved the co-optation of sectarian militia leaders into the 
government, the parliament and the upper levels of the administration. Alongside Nabih Berri, Walid 
Jumblat, Elias Hobeiqa, and for a short time Samir Geagea (former leaders of Amal, the Druze PSP, 
and the LF, respectively) the political leadership also incorporated representatives of the Alawite militia 
of Tripoli, a leader of the Ahbash (the radical Sunnis of Beirut) and, of course, leaders of Hizbollah. 
These militiamen who entered politics had a concept of public affairs different from that of the 
traditional communal leaders. Their objective was less about drawing an inter-sectarian consensus than 
of assuring a victory for their communal group‘s interest. In 1991, for example, Jumblat called for the 
creation of a ―ministry of the Mountain‖ which he counted on to provide benefits for his Druze 
constituents, comparable to those Nabih Berri had derived from his ―ministry of the South‖, created in 
1984 for the Shiites. He obtained the post of minister of the Displaced Persons, with control over some 
of the public and private subsidies for resettling Christians in their native villages in the Druze Shuf. 
More generally, appointments in the state bureaucracy were the result of hard bargaining among the 
―troika‖ of the three presidents – of the Republic, the Council of ministers, and the Parliament – each 
one seeking rewards for his own clientele. The list of senior civil servants thereby reflects more than 
ever the sectarian balance. At the highest levels of the state, interminable negotiations gave way to 
thinly veiled pressures, aggressive declarations, and zero-sum games. The balance of power, in the 
crude military sense of the expression, has become a permanent fact of Lebanese political life.  
Selective amnesty and amnesia are combined with deep social distrust, expressed through discreet but 
persistent segregationist practices. In place of the ‘aych mushtarak (common life) proclaimed by 
religious authorities, since the end of the war there has been a considerable segregation of communal 
groups: new homogeneous neighbourhoods, gated communities preoccupied with security against 
largely imaginary outside dangers, and a strong preference for sectarian schools. The most striking sign 
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of the deficiency in reconciliation can be seen in the failure of the return of the displaced persons: only 
a small number of the some 300,000 Christians who fled the Druze Shuf in September 1983, and of the 
70,000 others who left the outskirts of Sidon in the spring of 1985 after the defeat of the Lebanese 
Forces, have returned to their native villages.
11
 The enormous amount of money dispensed by the 
Lebanese state made it possible to rebuild churches in order to mark the sectarian identity of the land, 
and for each family to begin rebuild their house. But it could not convince people to return and live 
again in their original village. For the most part the process benefited political operators such as the 
minister of the Displaced Persons, who was more intent on distributing bounty to members of his Druze 
community than in promoting the return of Christians, despite his intent to block the territorial spread of 
the Shiites in his region.  
On the whole, the general split between Christians and Muslims has not decreased. Beneath the 
dialogue between religious hierarchies, and despite the frequent denial of social heterogeneity and local 
divisions, an unspoken suspicion persists, perhaps more on the Christian than on the Muslim side, 
almost as though the Maronites felt the country was no longer theirs. In the social arena, conflicts of 
identity concealed since the end of the war permeate other areas such as music and sports, which offer 
symbolic spaces to foster communal mobilisation.  
 
Between communal isolation and Islamist threat 
Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine how Lebanese society might accede to a common 
political culture that would make up the new basis for the Lebanese territorial state, not to mention the 
nation state. The reestablishment of the communal system under the aegis of the militias has made it 
possible to sidestep the debate on the identity and the future of the Lebanese state. It was a conservative 
choice, explicable in part because it served the ambitions of the state‘s new leaders, all concerned with 
strengthening the allegiance of their own communal constituencies. But the choice was also justified by 
the argument that adopting a non-sectarian method of representation based on a demographic majority 
carried with it the serious risk of a drift toward totalitarianism, as observed in neighbouring Arab states.  
In Lebanon, more precisely, behind the demands for secularisation and for adoption of majority rule, 
many feared the ambition of the representatives of a sociological majority – a Muslim, more precisely 
Shiite majority – who would be tempted to impose its values and its laws on all Lebanese citizens. 
However uncertain the demographic data, the Shiite community is universally recognised as the largest, 
and hence as a sociological majority.
12
 The Shiite leaders might be prone to manipulate demands for 
non-sectarianism because it might in the end allow them to establish an Islamist political regime that 
would impose the sharî‘a, including laws that prescribe an inferior status to the People of the Book - 
                                                                                       
11
 
Naufal 1998.
 
12 The electoral lists numbered 1,558,000 Muslims (56,55%) and 1,197,000 Christians (43,45%) in 2000. 
Considering a higher emigration of the Christians and the separate valuation of people under 21 years old by 
community, the Muslim/Christian ratio could be said to be 60 to 40, even 62 to 38 at the beginning of this 
century. Kassir 2000, 17.   
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Christians and Jews. By the law of numbers, a ―secularised‖ Lebanon would thus risk being 
transformed into an Islamic Republic.  
In Lebanon, Islamic radicalism developed following the failures of the left and the Arab nationalist 
movement during the earliest years of the civil war. The collapse of Arab nationalism, which had been 
the dominant ideology in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s, and the disillusionment with the 
struggle for the liberation of Palestine that had become the mobilising myth in the 1970s, left 
generations that felt frustrated and betrayed by their leaders. In the first years of the war, the secularist 
National Progressive Movement proved unable to preserve its unity and to stop the haemorrhage of its 
militants, in face of the organisations and leaders primarily concerned with the defence of their 
community. De-confessionalisation of the political system as claimed by its leader Jumblat might have 
open the way to a political democratisation only if accompanied by a step toward the society's 
secularisation, i.e. by undoing the lock of confessional personal status and recognising the rights of 
secular Lebanese citizenship. If these two processes – de-confessionalization of the state and 
secularisation of the society - are not carried out simultaneously, the first alone, with the adoption of the 
majority system, amounts to imposing the political vision of the demographically dominant group. In 
the first years of the war, such a demand from Muslim constituencies worked as a lever for gaining 
acceptance of their demand for political "participation". Though, in affirming in a controversial article 
that an Islamic government was theoretically possible and ideally desirable, Husayn al-Quwwatlî, 
director of Dar el-Fatwa, then the legal authority of the Sunni community, did not help, far from it, to 
remove all hindrances to the plans for de-confessionalization.
13
 Mûsâ Sadr himself, the charismatic 
leader of the Shiite movement Amal, fostered ambiguity by referring to a program of secularisation and 
intercommunal cooperation on the one hand, and to his a-historical vision of politics inspired by 
religious beliefs, on the other. The same ambiguity has been maintained by sheikh Muhammad Husayn 
Fadlallah, the highest Lebanese spiritual authority after the war: while conceding that Lebanese society 
is not ready for the establishment of an Islamic state, he would not rule out the possibility of one.
14 
 
 
Toward federalism? 
A communal society such as that of Lebanon cannot content itself with the individual federalism 
organised by the code of personal status and the Electoral law, whose devices, while relatively 
functional during periods of civil peace, have proved to be highly inefficient in the security field during 
a period of discord. Therefore, during the war a claim for regional autonomy, especially on the part of 
the supporters of «cultural pluralism» among the intellectuals of the (Christian) Lebanese Front,
15
 was 
put forward. For them, ta’âyush, Lebanese conviviality, requires voluntary choice, through a real 
                                                                                       
13  Al-Safir, 18 August 1975.  
14 On the debate among the Lebanese Shiites on Ayatollah Khomaynî‘s proclamation of the wilâyat al-faqîh -- 
the return of political power to the ―just jurisconsult,‖ Sivan 1985. For the position of Ayatollah Fadlallah, 
Sharâra 1997, 121. 
15 Fâris 1979. Entelis 1979. 
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autonomy of the communities, in other words without either physical or legal constraint from the 
central power over the communal segments. The stability of consensus democracy therefore involves 
the territorialisation of communal identities, which supposedly entails federalism being easier to apply. 
They strongly recommend not only the monitoring by each community of its educational system and 
cultural affairs, but even the appropriation and redistribution of local resources, and especially the 
control of its economic co-operation and political relations with foreign countries. Thus, they covet the 
regal prerogatives of the central State they consider at the very most as an authority for 
accommodation.
16
 The sovereignist option looms on the horizon of the federalist agenda, in 
contradiction with the choice of a centralised political system, supposed to guarantee a stable 
democracy in a society plagued with a fragmentary culture.
17
 
After the war, the cantonisation of Lebanon initiated by its warlords has lost its impetus. Especially, the 
partition between a Christian «smaller Lebanon» and the rest of the country has failed, so that the local 
forces finally handed back its prerogatives to the central State almost everywhere. Theoretically at least, 
the right to reside wherever one pleases in the country and to call the legal government to account - two 
basic characteristics of democracy - have again been bestowed on every Lebanese.
18
 With a view to 
putting an end to the divisions of the war period, the federal formula was firmly rejected by the authors 
of the Taif compromise. At the most an administrative decentralisation «with a view to development»
19
 
might be carried out. The spectre of separatism remains so formidable, and dissension so hard to 
manage for a power, which claims to represent consensus, that the limited decentralisation provided by 
the Taif accord, might  just as  well  be emptied of its contents. As a matter of consequence, in the name 
of national unity, the possibility of promoting local democracy and revivifying grass roots political life 
in order to counterbalance the central power has seemingly been wasted.
20
  
In spite of the veto against federalism, the autonomy of communal segments and the right of veto which 
constitute the consociational guarantees of minority respect, are properly enforced in the Lebanese 
constitutional system. Indeed, Articles 9, 10 and 95 of the Constitution officially guarantee the 
constitutive elements of the autonomy of communal segments. The exercise of minority right of veto is 
guaranteed by Article 57. After the war, this principle has been under threat several times, as shown by 
the «exceptional» and «temporary» amendments imposed on the parliament to prolong the presidential 
mandate of Elyâs Hrâwî (October 1995) and to manipulate the Electoral Law (1992, 1996, December 
1999), against the growing resistance from some deputies and many groups in the civil society. 
Notwithstanding these new unconstitutional practices, the revision adopted at Taif confirmed the 
principle of veto right, i.e. the requirement of a two-thirds majority for the adoption of important 
                                                                                       
16 Migdal 1988, 4, 237 & 264. 
17 Lijphart 1968, 212. 
18 It is however doubtful that all Lebanese enjoy this right equally and can benefit from it in practice, faced with 
discriminating real estate policies recommended by some communal authorities and practices of intimidation on 
the ground. 
19 President Elyâs Hrâwî, cited by Al-Hayât, 13 December 1989. 
20 Favier 2000, 12. 
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decisions both by the parliament and the government. The autonomy of communal groups and the 
acknowledgement of their veto right so definitely remain at the heart of Lebanese institutional logic, 
that we may wonder if the rule of pluralistic representation hasn‘t taken precedence over that of national 
integration.  
Obviously, that hasn‘t appeased frustrations and communal fears. Minorities of all kinds have 
continually complained about being neglected, picked on, and even excluded from the Lebanese 
system, and this has been more than ever the case in the post war period. Today, members of the 
Christian minority are far from being sanguine about having lost their status as a political majority, 
tokenised by Maronite centrality in the state of Greater Lebanon, and embodied in the presidential 
function. The relative Shiite Muslim majority was legally consigned to the minority until the creation of 
its Higher Council in 1973, and politically until the revaluation of the presidency of parliament since 
1992. The Druze minority, whose relative demographic weight has been diminishing for the past two 
centuries, is claiming for the presidency of a communal Senate, in the name of consociational 
democracy well understood. The Armenian minorities, which the collapse of the Soviet system has 
rooted in their Lebanese identity are now refusing to be marginalised inside it. etc. One cannot 
underestimate to what a degree the system is underpinned by inter-communal tensions. Not only was 
the war itself the indicator of such tensions and structural imbalances, but it moreover amplified them 
by giving birth to a particularly divided and agonistic social formation.
21
 
How can the guarantees for minorities be implemented by the state, understood and accepted by 
society, if the reasons justifying them are concealed and the values founding them are denied? The 
representation of minorities within the political system has to be relayed by the mediation of a common 
political culture which organises the relations between state and society. But a political culture can‘t 
come into being on command. It feeds on a historical experience and is built up through the expression 
of differences, and negotiation over their settlement. Between the «culture of discord» denounced by 
Georges Corm
22
 and the official discourse of reconciliation, seeps the huge silence of amnesia which 
objects any expression of grievances and prejudices. Between the defence of particularisms and the 
acceptance of a common political order, there lacks the bond of civility which would enable the 
Lebanese to share an ethical basis for the respect of minority differences, and the recognition of their 
practical limits.  
The paradoxical contradiction between the respect of the minority provided for in the constitutional text 
and its negation through the rejection of the Other, represents the first deficiency of the Lebanese 
political system with regard to the principles of political communalism. Some intellectuals and 
organisations of the civil society are aware of this, and are trying to remedy it through a work of 
collective memory (concerning missing persons, or the commemoration of main events of the war) and 
                                                                                       
21 On war as productive of social identities, Giddens 1985; Creveld 1991. 
22 Corm 1992, 225. 
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inter-communal dialogue so as to instil a shared political culture as a foundation of the state‘s 
legitimacy.  
 
The issue of numbers 
Disagreement between Christians and Muslims on the content of national culture is often related to the 
logic of political representation which reflects not so much the demographic balance as the question of 
power ratio. Since the adoption of the Taif agreement, the Christians, while constituting less than 40% 
of the Lebanese living in the country, have half of the parliamentary seats at their disposal.
23
 But we 
also know that the majority of the Christian deputies elected in 1992, 1996 and 2000 were so thanks to a 
number of Muslim votes and especially to the acquiescence of the «poles of power» (aqtâb), and are 
thus deprived of their veto power. A consociational adjustment such as the adoption at Taif of a 
Christian / Muslim parity is therefore the cause of a general frustration, since it in no way corresponds 
to the «reality» presented in a contradictory manner by the parties. It is in no position to safeguard the 
minority but has opened the way to alliances and coalitions, of which it has become the hostage. 
Precisely because the Lebanese political system is not a system of majority democracy, it is illusory to 
think that its improvement would only require a quantitative adjustment. 
Such a quantitative, or demographic, adjustment for the imperfections of the Lebanese system would 
unfailingly open a crisis between the majority community (or rather, the first of the minorities as no 
communal group can claim 50 percent of the nation) and the others. The democratic deficit remains 
inherent in a communal state. Firstly, because communalism affords a favourable ground for patronage 
which substitutes for citizenship relation. In such a system, the political decision belongs to a few 
patrons, zu‘âmâ’, whose domination relies on the perpetuation of communal divisions. Secondly, 
because the community tends to impose its own form of totalitarian imprisonment onto the individual 
by denying him a free will and the right to exist outside it. In order to hold onto its power over the 
polity, it denies individual freedom, especially that of unbelievers, and appeals to collective solidarity in 
the political realm.    
Overcoming the obstacle of the fragility of the communal consensus therefore implies looking in 
another direction than numerical change in order to enhance the national dialogue, and finally move on 
to a stable democracy.
24
 It is not enough however to acknowledge this requirement and expect that an 
«instrumental logic» will lead to an ineluctable development toward a more «real» democracy.
25
 We 
can only observe that the new political share-out of Taif has been powerless to bridge the rift between 
communities or to re-enforce this «common good» which is the foundation of a political project. On the 
                                                                                       
23 Kassir 2000,  17.  
24 Lijphart 1968, 211. 
25 Contrary to what Ghassan Salamah suggests. Salame 1994, 132. 
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contrary, it contributes, once again, by delaying and even banning the access of people (ahl) of each 
community to the political arena, to upholding the communal social order (tâ’ifî).26  
 
Political elites and the instrumentalisation of the communal divide 
Beside the communal consensus, the Lebanese formula requires the implementation of a government 
coalition. In Lebanon, such a coalition had depended on a carefully balanced proportional 
representation between the seven largest communities (Sunni, Shiite and Druze among the Muslims; 
Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Armenian Orthodox among the Christians). Thus has 
been sought for and laboriously enacted the requirement of a multiple balance of power. Moreover, 
since independence in the 1943 it rested on a Maronite-Sunni agreement, the National Pact of 1943, 
which introduced a kind of partnership between the Maronite president and the Sunni Prime minister. It 
was an unequal partnership, between an unaccountable executive leader and a government leader 
threatened by parliamentary wrath and popular revolt but the undeniable advantage of this arrangement 
was that a logic was then imposed onto Lebanese state-building – the logic of a Maronite hegemon – 
although the sense of national interest was generally lacking. After the war, the troika of the three 
presidents was substituted for the government tandems and the veto mutually exerted by the Prime 
minister, by the president of the Republic and the president of the Parliament are considered as 
evidence of a systematic seeking for consensus, for the greater equality within the troika introduced by 
Taif means that Lebanon has become a little more consociational. 
But then the question of the meaning of such co-operation arises. The Lebanese communal consensus 
rests on (to say the least) normative premises according to which the inter-elites agreement negotiated 
since the beginning of the 19
th
 century has reflected the expectations of the grass roots of each 
community and not only the alliance of powerful families who are hardly representative of such a social 
base. In a highly hierarchical society, one in which the distance between the khâssa, the elite, and the 
‗amma, the people, is deeply programmed into collective consciousness, these masses have constantly 
been subjected to the communal framework, while the edification of a national identity has been 
hampered, and the existence of a general interest ignored. The objective of the National Pact in 1943 
was nothing more than to ensure the structural predominance of the elite, to the exclusion of all other 
social groups - when all is said and done, to perpetuate an oligarchy. In the recent period the 
replacement of the traditional notables at the head of each community by militia lumpen-elites was in 
no way a break with the formula of sectarian consensus, but rather the strategic outcome of the 
manipulation of identities and communal memories in the interest of these same elites. The people of 
each communal group responded to these manipulations by promoting even more radical elites, who 
drove the segmental logic to its outer limits: The closing off of the communal territory, the rejection of 
the Other, the reduction to servitude of the communal subject. Thus, the decommissioning of militias 
and the adoption of a law of amnesty which was presented as a return to the pre-war «civic» communal 
                                                                                       
26 Maqdissi 1996. 
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consensus, corresponded in fact to a contrary logic: That of the re-integration into the very core of the 
communal system of the militiamen who had originally sown the seeds of discord, enabling them to 
grab their slice of the benefits of power-sharing, within the framework of a reconstruction process 
whose financial stakes are by far in excess of anything that the pre-war communal elites had been 
accustomed to fighting over. 
Heirs to the traditional oligarchy / ex- militia leaders covertly in sworn complicity with a foreign power 
/ venture capitalists operating at the confines of a privatised state. Such is the trilogy toward which the 
coalition of communal elites has allowed itself to drift, as the sole winners of a war, which has 
destroyed the state and atomised society. After the war, the restoration of communalism was precisely 
chosen to bring a society torn by deep divisions to settle back into pre-existing categories.  
 
Can religion substitute for politics? 
Considering the kind of blockade that paralyses the dynamics of the Lebanese system altogether top-
down (through political instrumentalisation of communal divides) and bottom-up (due to societal 
withdrawal on primordial solidarities) the post war period appears a period of renewed importance of 
the clerics of all sects, and their upsurge on the political scene. This process is not completely new in 
Lebanon where secular elites and clerical elites took turns, and competed for country leadership during 
the past century and a half, with strong Maronite Patriarchs taking a national role in periods of crisis, 
such as Patriarch Howayek during WW1, and Patriarch Meouchy during the 1958 civil war.
27
 
What can be observed in the post war period is a similar phenomenon. As old notabilities and pre-war 
political leaders have been nearly annihilated, and warlords strongly discredited, the people within each 
communal group found no recourse but in clerical leaders for moral, but also political advise. Without 
going into details, the two emblematic figures of today‘s Lebanon are without doubt Patriarch cardinal 
Boutros Nasrallah Sfeir (the highest Maronite authority) and Sayyid Husayn Fadlallah, a Shiite marja‘ 
(source of imitation) whose advices are sought beyond the borders of Lebanon (especially in Iraq). 
Without denying the conciliatory role often played by clerical elites and religious intellectuals, their 
role in the sectarian division of the society has to be examined. 
Sometimes for the good, sometimes with a negative tone, the substitution of clerical elites for secular 
elites has the effect of confessionalising any public issue in Lebanon. As a result, the wording and 
solving of political, security, economic issues are each time turned into inter-sectarian competition. 
Their solution implicitly involves the victory of one community over another (or one religion over the 
other if we think in terms of Christians/Muslims divide). Most of the time, public issues are stuck in a 
stalemate because of inter-sectarian competition, even in issues that have nothing to do with religion. 
Two examples are worth mentioning here: First, there is a consensus in post war Lebanon about the 
necessity to revise the Electoral Law adopted in 1926, and especially to reshape the Lebanese electoral 
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map in order to remedy to two major flaws – namely the monopolisation of parliamentary and 
municipal seats by traditional notables and their heirs (the Frangiehs and the Hamadas, or today the 
Lahouds) on the one hand, and the over-representation of mountain and rural areas while 60 percent of 
the population lives in greater Beirut, on the other hand. While these issues have nothing to do with 
communal identities, the post war debate on electoral reform remains focused on the issue of the size of 
the electoral constituency. Why? Because it is a means for either comforting the independence of 
Christian MPs (in small constituencies, the qadhât) or making them dependent from a larger Muslim 
electorate (in large constituencies, the muhâfadhât). 
The second example of the confessionalisation of public issues relates to the debate about the presence 
of several hundred thousands of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and their possible final installation 
(tawtîn) in the country. To make it short, the issue arouse hot debates in 1994 after the Oslo Israeli-
Palestinian agreement was signed, and again since the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. 
The issue of Palestinian settlement in Lebanon boils down, in every public debate, to the question of 
accepting the integration (at least socially, if not by granting them citizenship) of an important Sunni 
population in a country where Christians already represent less than 35 percent of the Lebanese 
residents. Religious divines of all denomination took a strong stand in the debate. However, instead of 
reasoning in terms of human rights, democracy and collective development, they interfered in mundane 
and political tactics such as land purchase and the organisation of protest or support rallies. The guiding 
principle at work in the clerics‘ involvement into politics is the struggle for hegemony: The fall of the 
Maronite hegemon through the war, and its possible substitution by a Muslim hegemon.  
Clearly, the substitution of clerical elites for secular elites has the effect of polarising not only social but 
also political loyalties around sects. Before the war, consociational politics had been organised by and 
around moderate leaders - Raymond Eddé being the paragon, and his forced marginalisation in 1978 a 
sad indication of the limits of the process. In the past decade, on the contrary, the inscription of political 
and social life under the banner of communalism contributes to the revival of sectarian intolerance. It 
gives rise to new extremist leaders such as the young Sammy Gemayel among the Maronites, or Sunnis 
fundamentalist clerics such as Salim al-Islam Shahhal in Tripoli. While programmatic parties have been 
eradicated by militia take-over, and trans-communal mobilisation systematically suppressed by 
confessional leaders, today within each sect, secular moderate elites are systematically marginalised: 
The Christian Qornet Chahwan group of reformists has not been able to gain legitimacy in front of its 
Christian constituency, nor among its pairs from other sects. Among the Shiites, Amal and Hizbollah 
antagonise intellectuals like Jihad al-Zayn or secular leaders like Ali Husaynî. Nawaf Salam, the heir of 
the big Sunni family, is blamed for not involving enough in community affairs. Safia Saadé‘s secular 
stand is denounced as heresy in her Orthodox community, and she is utterly marginalised, etc. The only 
exception to this negative picture can be found among young and fragile trans-sectarian movements 
such as students‘ organisations, ecologists, and human rights advocacy groups. 
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The problem today is that it is difficult, nearly impossible, for a Lebanese, to identify himself with a 
leader from another sect, or to put his trust into a leader from another sect. An exception worthy of note 
was the figure of Patriarch Sfeir during the summer of 2001 when he toured Mount Lebanon and 
especially the Druze regions, calling for national reconciliation, and a common political struggle for 
national independence (meaning from Syrian presence, for Israelis had left a year before). At that time, 
he received a large trans-communal support, and people from all regions and denominations hailed him 
as a national hero. But soon after, his national image shattered when the Druze leader Jumblat 
reconciled with Syria, and denounced Sfeir‘s collusion with Christian extremists from the diaspora. 
 
** 
  
Fifteen years after the adoption of the Taif agreement, the restoration and strengthening of political 
communalism has failed to bestow a consensual foundation in Lebanon. The national life remains 
hampered by religious and sectarian divisions. Such a conclusion calls for a critical reappraisal of 
consociational democracy, a political system adopted by Lebanon since the birth of the state, and 
favoured in other countries characterised by religious pluralism such as Bosnia (in 1994), and tomorrow 
Iraq and Sudan. It also draws attention of analysts and policymakers toward the kind of institutional and 
practical responses to offer to popular demands in the wake of domestic conflicts expressed in terms of 
religious identities. Namely, the urgent need of recognition, rule of law, and security.  
Today, some Lebanese clerics advocate adoption of ―religious secularism‖, i.e., further 
institutionalisation of religious parties, and their participation in the political game in due respect of its 
rule. However, the comparison they draw with Christian political parties in Western Europe (in Italy, 
Germany, and France) and with AKP in Turkey is irrelevant. In a country marked by institutionalised 
communalism, religious identities lack flexibility. They become tools in the political competition rather 
than bases for compromise and cooperation. In a country where the individual is submitted to the rule of 
the community, the civil society remains segmented and powerless in front of the state. Beyond the 
respectable endeavour of clerics from all denomination in favour of national reconciliation, the 
Lebanese need a gradual reform of their political institutions, through the introduction of non-sectarian 
professional and political representation. They also need to adopt a clear distinction between the 
religious and the political, the private and the public, spheres.  
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